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Abstract
In this paper, we demonstrate a physical adversar-
ial patch attack against object detectors, notably
the YOLOv3 detector. Unlike previous work on
physical object detection attacks, which required
the patch to overlap with the objects being mis-
classified or avoiding detection, we show that a
properly designed patch can suppress virtually all
the detected objects in the image. That is, we can
place the patch anywhere in the image, causing
all existing objects in the image to be missed en-
tirely by the detector, even those far away from
the patch itself. This in turn opens up new lines of
physical attacks against object detection systems,
which require no modification of the objects in
a scene. A demo of the system can be found at
https://youtu.be/WXnQjbZ1e7Y.
1. Introduction
This paper considers the creation of adversarial patches
against object detection systems. Broadly, adversarial patch
attacks refer to a class of attacks on machine learning sys-
tems that add some “patch” or perturbation to the image
causing the system to mislabel the image. Unlike traditional
adversarial examples, they are not imperceptible, but modify
the image in a way that should not change the underlying
output according to human intuition. Past work has demon-
strated the feasibility of these attacks (including in physical
settings) in the context of classification (Brown et al., 2017;
Kurakin et al., 2018) and object detection (Eykholt et al.,
2018; Xie et al., 2017; Thys et al., 2019). However, in the
object detection setting, these attacks have required a user to
manipulate the object being attacked itself, i.e., by placing
the patch over the object.
We present an alternative (and we believe, stronger) adver-
sarial patch attack against object detection. Specifically,
we construct a physical adversarial patch that, when placed
in a image, suppresses all objects previously detected in
the image, even those that are relatively far away from the
patch. The techniques we use to design the patch are rela-
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tively straightforward applications of existing techniques:
projected gradient descent approaches (Kurakin et al., 2017;
Madry et al., 2017) followed by expectation over transfor-
mations (Athalye et al., 2018), specifically optimizing a loss
that we believe to be well-suited to object detection systems.
We demonstrate our attack on the YOLOv3 architecture, ro-
bustly suppressing detections over a wide range of positions
for the object. We illustrate the power of the method both
on the COCO dataset, where we evaluate the mAP of the
system after the attack, and with a physical attack against
YOLOv3 running in real-time on webcam input. The possi-
bility of such attacks opens up new threat vectors for many
machine learning systems. For example, it suggests it would
be possible to suppress the detection of all objects for an
autonomous car’s vision system (e.g. pedestrians, other cars,
street signs), not by requiring us to manipulate each object,
but just by placing a well-crafted sign on the sidewalk.
2. Related Work
The field of adversarial attacks against machine learning
systems is broad enough at this point that we focus here only
on the related work most closely related to our approach.
2.1. Adversarial Patch for Classification
Adversarial patch attacks were first introduced by (Brown
et al., 2017) for image classifiers. The goal is to produce
localized, robust, and universal perturbations that are ap-
plied to an image by masking instead of adding pixels. The
patch found by (Brown et al., 2017) is able to fool multiple
ImageNet models into predicting “toaster” whenever the
patch is in view, even in physical space as a printed sticker.
However, because classification systems only classify each
image as a single class, to some extent this attack relies on
the fact that it can simply place a high-confidence “deep net
toaster” into an image (even if it does not look like a toaster
to humans) and override other classes in the image.
2.2. Adversarial Patches for Image Segmentation
Because of the limitations of the classification setting, sev-
eral other works have investigated the use of adversarial
patches in the object detection setting (Sharif et al., 2016;
Eykholt et al., 2018; Sharif et al., 2018; Thys et al., 2019;
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Chen et al., 2018; Bose & Aarabi, 2018). However, for the
few cases in this domain dealing with physical adversarial
examples, virtually all focused on the creation of an object
that overlaps the object of interest, to either change its class
or suppress detection. In contrast, our approach looks specif-
ically at adversarial patches that do not overlap the objects
of interest in the scene.
The work that bears the most similarity to our own is the
DPatch method (Liu et al., 2018), which explicitly creates
patches that do not overlap with the objects of interest. How-
ever, the DPatch method was only tested on digital images,
and contains a substantial flaw that makes it unsuitable for
real experiments: the patches produced in the DPatch work
are never clipped to the allowable image range (i.e., clip-
ping colors to the [0, 1] range) and thus do not correspond
to actual perturbed images. Furthermore, it is not trivial to
use the DPatch loss to obtain valid adversarial images: we
compare this approach to our own and show that we are able
to generate substantially stronger attacks.
2.3. YOLO
YOLO is a “one-shot” object detector with state-of-the-art
performance on certain metrics running up to 3× faster than
other models (Redmon & Farhadi, 2018). It treats the input
image as an S × S grid, each cell predicting B bounding
boxes and their confidence scores; and each box predicting
C class probabilities, conditioned on there being an object
in the box. We specifically use the YOLOv3 model as
the object detection system we use for our demonstrations,
though other object detectors would be possible as well.
3. Methodology
3.1. Notation
Let hθ denote a hypothesis function with parameters θ defin-
ing the model (layers, weights, etc); x denote some input to
hθ with a corresponding target of y; and J(hθ(x), y) denote
a loss function mapping predictions made by the hypothesis
hθ on input x and the target y to some real-valued number.
3.2. Attack Formulation
Here we present our methodology for creating adversarial
patches for object detection. Note that the methods here
are based upon existing work: specifically untargeted PGD
with expection over transformation, but the results suggest
that these attacks are surprisingly stronger than previously
thought. We consider the following mathematical formula-
tion of finding an adversarial patch:
argmax
δ
E(x,y)∼D,t∼T [J(hθ(A(δ, x, t)), y)]
where D is a distribution over samples, T is a distribution
over patch transformations (to be discussed shortly), and A
is a “patch application function” that transforms the patch
δ with t and applies the result to the image x by masking
the appropriate pixels. Note that the maximization over δ
is done outside the expectation, i.e., we are considering a
class of “universal” adversarial perturbations.
The DPatch method attempts to solve a similar objective
by minimizing the loss for a carefully crafted target yˆ as
described in (Liu et al., 2018), performing the update:
δ := δ − α∇δJ(hθ(A(δ, x, t)), yˆ) (1)
While this update works fairly well for fitting patches in the
digital space, our experiments show that patches found in
this way are weakly adversarial when a box-constraint is
applied, requiring many update iterations and consistently
plateauing at a relatively high mAP (see Figure 3). Reasons
we believe DPatch fails are elaborated in subsection 3.7.
Instead, we adopt a simpler approach and simply take the
optimization problem at face value and maximize the loss
for the original targets y directly for samples and transforma-
tions drawn from D and T respectively. This is essentially
just the standard untargeted PGD approach (Madry et al.,
2017), originally introduced as the Basic Iterative Method
(Kurakin et al., 2017), with expectation over transformation
(Athalye et al., 2018) applied to the patch itself. The update
does not push the patch δ towards any particular target label
or bounding box. This contrasts with the DPatch update in
Equation 1 which requires a target label in yˆ for both the un-
targeted and targeted cases; this is generally a non-issue as
our goal is to suppress detections. Also following past work,
we consider a normalized steepest ascent method under the
`∞ norm, which results in the update
δ := clip[0,1](δ + α · sign(∇δJ(hθ(A(δ, x, t)), y)) (2)
for a sample x ∼ D and transformation t ∼ T .
3.3. Experimental Setup
We evaluate on YOLOv3 pretrained for COCO 2014 (Lin
et al., 2014) (416 × 416 pixels). The implementation of
YOLOv3 achieves around 55.4% mAP-50 (mAP at 0.5 IOU
metric) using an object-confidence threshold of 0.001 for
non-max suppression. Because mAP is considerably influ-
enced by this threshold, we also evaluate at the 0.1 confi-
dence threshold used during validation, as well as the 0.5
confidence threshold used by default for real-time detec-
tion. The implementation achieves 50.3% mAP-50 at the
0.1 confidence threshold and 40.9% at 0.5.
We define a “step” as 1, 000 iterations. The following exper-
iments were run for 300 steps with an initial learning rate of
0.1 and momentum of 0.9, which were chosen heuristically.
Learning rate was decayed by 0.95 every 5 steps, at which
point we also run one validation step for the mAP-50 plots.
Because the loss functions are highly non-convex, we take
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(a) Training Loss (Ours) (b) mAP-50 (Ours)
(c) Training Loss (DPatch) (d) mAP-50 (DPatch)
Figure 1. Our method vs. DPatch for the unclipped case.
Method Conf. mAP (%) Smallest AP (%) Largest AP (%)
Baseline 0.001 55.4 10.23 (Hair Drier) 87.61 (Giraffe)
Baseline 0.1 50.3 3.03 (Toaster) 82.13 (Giraffe)
Baseline 0.5 40.9 0 (Toaster) 79.53 (Giraffe)
DPatch 0.001 9.21 0.17 (Traffic Light) 26.07 (Clock)
DPatch 0.1 7.23 0 (Toaster) 19.83 (Mouse)
DPatch 0.5 4.88 0 (Toaster) 15.83 (Microwave)
Ours 0.001 0.25 0 (Aeroplane) 2.2 (Sports Ball)
Ours 0.1 0.1 0 (Aeroplane) 1.2 (Knife)
Ours 0.5 0.05 0 (Bicycle) 0.76 (Aeroplane)
Table 1. Summary for the unclipped case. “Baseline” is no patch.
the best of 5 random restarts to mitigate the effects of local
optima. Where applicable, patch transformations involved
randomly rotating around the x, y, z axes, randomly scaling
and translating, and randomly adjusting the brightness of
the patch (converting to HSV and scaling V).
3.4. Unclipped Attack
For the unclipped attack, our method performs the update
in Equation 2, except without clipping. The purpose is to
benchmark against DPatch which uses Equation 1. For both
methods, t scales the patch to a fixed 120× 120 pixels and
positions at top-left of the image (as in (Liu et al., 2018)).
Figure 1 shows that our method achieves approximately
0 mAP after only 5 steps, whereas DPatch converges to
roughly 3 mAP after 50 steps. From our experiments, low-
ering the learning rate or decaying more aggressively does
not help to decrease the DPatch mAP, perhaps indicating a
limitation in the loss function itself.
Table 1 shows the overall mAP as well as smallest and
largest per-class APs for various confidence thresholds.
These values were obtained by evaluating on the entire val-
idation set instead of just one “step”. Our DPatch results
are mostly consistent with (Liu et al., 2018) which reports
3.4 mAP for the untargeted attack on YOLOv2 and Pascal
VOC 2007 – deviations are expected due to differences in
implementation, model architecture and dataset.
Figure 2. ROI plots for the unclipped case. Top row shows original.
(a) Training Loss (Ours) (b) mAP-50 (Ours)
(c) Training Loss (DPatch) (d) mAP-50 (DPatch)
Figure 3. Our method vs. DPatch for the clipped case.
To verify that our patch attacks at the bounding box proposal
level, we plot the pre-non-max suppression bounding box
confidence scores for a random image, shown in Figure 2.
3.5. Clipped Attack
For the clipped attack, our method performs the update
from Equation 2. We compare with DPatch, which uses
Equation 1 but modified to clip the patch to [0, 1].
Figure 3 shows the loss and mAP plots for a clipped patch
with all transforms as described in subsection 3.3. Specifi-
cally, we randomly rotated [−5, 5]◦ for x, y and [−10, 10]◦
for z; scaled between 80 × 80 to 120 × 120 pixels; and
adjusted brightness by factor from [0.4, 1.6]. Translations
were sampled post-scaling such that the patch could ap-
pear in any location in the image, and scale was adjusted to
ensure the patch is not “cut off” after rotation.
The DPatch method quickly converges to a patch that is
weakly adversarial, whereas our method achieves single-
digit mAP values. As in the unclipped case, random restarts
and hyperparameter tuning do not appear to help DPatch
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Method Conf. mAP Smallest AP (%) Largest AP (%)
Baseline 0.001 55.4 10.23 (Hair Drier) 87.61 (Giraffe)
Baseline 0.1 50.3 3.03 (Toaster) 82.13 (Giraffe)
Baseline 0.5 40.9 0 (Toaster) 79.53 (Giraffe)
DPatch 0.001 39.6 9.09 (Hair Drier) 69.03 (Train)
DPatch 0.1 34.7 0 (Toaster) 66.3 (Bus)
DPatch 0.5 26.8 0 (Toaster) 58.1 (Bus)
Ours 0.001 13.8 1.27 (Zebra) 34.69 (Car)
Ours 0.1 10.4 0 (Toaster) 30.18 (Car)
Ours 0.5 7.2 0 (Hot Dog) 23.06 (Person)
Table 2. Summary for the clipped case. “Baseline” is no patch.
(a) Ours (b) DPatch
Figure 4. Comparison of patches.
Figure 5. ROI plots for the clipped case. Top row shows original.
improve significantly. Table 2 shows the AP breakdown as
evaluated on the entire validation set, this time applying the
patch at random locations in the image.
Our patch achieves as low as 7.2 mAP, almost comparable to
an unclipped DPatch. The clipped DPatch is only marginally
better than a random image. Our patch also uniquely cap-
tures semantically meaningful patterns (zebra stripes) that
are most salient to the detector. Like the unclipped case,
Figure 5 shows that our patch successfully attracts most of
the region proposals.
3.6. Physical Attack
Figure 6 shows a printed version of our patch attacking
YOLOv3 running real-time with a standard webcam. The
patch was printed on regular printer paper and recorded un-
der natural lighting. While the patch is somewhat invariant
to location, the patch generally has weaker influence on
objects that are farther away, as seen in Figure 7 – when
positioned at the sides, the patch needs to be enlarged to
successfully disable distant detections, and fails to disable
sufficiently confident ones. However, the patch is able to
Figure 6. Physical attack using our patch.
Figure 7. Location invariance of our patch in physical space.
Figure 8. Moving object suppression in physical space.
disable detections that are moving, so long as the patch itself
is stable, as shown in Figure 8. This shows that our patch
works on a data distribution different from the training dis-
tribution, and is generally adversarial over different lighting
conditions, positions and orientations.
3.7. Discussion
We suspect DPatch struggles because it centralizes all
ground truth boxes around the patch – it ultimately resides in
a single cell, meaning the loss is dominated by the proposal
“responsible” for that cell. As long as the patch is recog-
nized, the model incurs little penalty for predicting all the
other objects, perhaps suffering penalty on the objectness
scores but not on bounding boxes or class labels. The loss
can there be reduced even if the model behavior does not
change much. And in practice, the patch is often detected
with high confidence without suppressing other detections.
In our method, every grid cell overlapped by a ground truth
box contributes to the loss, which increases the most when
the model fails to predict any ground truth box.
4. Conclusion
We introduce a patch attack causing YOLOv3 to drop from
55.4 to single digit mAP. We show that this method outper-
forms the existing DPatch method in the untargeted case,
which generally has equivalently significant implications as
a targeted attack. Finally, we demonstrate that our attack
extends to the physical space by printing our patch and fool-
ing YOLOv3 running real-time via webcam feed, which to
our knowledge is the first demonstration of a patch attack
on object detectors that successfully suppresses detections
without having to overlap the patch and the target objects.
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